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At the end of October, the Chinese Communist 
Party held its 19th National Congress. The CCP 
has held these gatheringsevery five years since 
1977, when Deng Xiaoping, the father of reform-
era China, took power at the 11th party congress. 
Mao Zedong had died the year before, leaving 
the party in turmoil and the country in shambles 
in the wake of his Cultural Revolution. Deng set 
out to establish order, institutionalize the 
relationship between the party and the state, 
and set China on the path toward opening and 
reform. 
It took 20 years for “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” 
which laid out “the basic issues concerning 
building, consolidating, and developing 
socialism in China,” to be enshrined in the CCP 
constitution at the 15th National Congress, held 
in September 1997. Deng, who had passed away 
February of that year, didn’t live to see the day. 
Having effectively ruled China for two decades, 
Deng must have had little doubt about his place 
in Chinese history. Then again, Mao ruled China 
for most of three decades only to have his own 
legacy discarded in less than twelve months. 
Perhaps that’s why China’s current president, 
chairman of the Central Military Commission, 
and general secretary of the Communist Party of 
China, Xi Jinping, has left nothing to chance. 
Just five years into his rule, he has arranged for 
“Xi Jinping Thought” to be enshrined in the 
constitution. 
The resolution encapsulating Xi Jinping 
thought, which goes under the unwieldy title “Xi 
Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era,” was unanimously 
passed by the 2,287 delegates to the party 
congress. The resolution opens with an 
obligatory endorsement of all Xi’s policies to 
date, which were summed up in the 14 points of 
Xi’s opening speech to the congress. It ends with 
a pious exhortation to the party faithful to “think 
in big-picture terms” while firmly upholding the 
“leadership of the Central Committee with 
Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.” In between is 
the heart of the program, a 131-word 
statement of Xi’s program of governance. Such a 
concise governing philosophy is worth quoting 
in full: 
The Communist Party of China shall uphold its 
absolute leadership over the People’s Liberation 
Army and other people’s armed forces; 
implement Xi Jinping’s thinking on 
strengthening the military; strengthen the 
development of the People’s Liberation Army by 
enhancing its political loyalty, strengthening it 
through reform and technology, and running it 
in accordance with the law; build people’s 
forces that obey the Party’s command, can fight 
and win, and maintain excellent conduct; 
ensure that the People’s Liberation Army 
accomplishes its missions and tasks in the new 
era; foster a strong sense of community for the 
Chinese nation; uphold justice while pursuing 
shared interests; work to build a community 
with a shared future for mankind; follow the 
principle of achieving shared growth through 
discussion and collaboration; and pursue the 
Belt and Road Initiative. 
Of the ten clauses, the first five focus on the 
military, the next four on society, and the final 
one on foreign policy, which serves as a tidy 
summary of Xi’s priorities—and likely those of 
the CCP as a whole. The world may look 
hopefully to Xi’s speeches for signs of liberal 
internationalism, but Xi Jinping Thought is an 
unabashed program of national revival backed 
up by increasing military power. 
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PARTY FIRST, ARMY SECOND 
Although the clear first principle of Xi Jinping 
Thought is Party First, Xi himself is better 
known for his Chinese Dream of building “a 
moderately prosperous society” amid a program 
of “national rejuvenation.” Put “Party First” 
ahead of the “Chinese Dream” and you get an 
authoritarian version of a prosperity gospel that 
might be called America First with Chinese 
Characteristics. Xi may be the supreme leader of 
a dictatorship, but that doesn’t mean that he is 
immune to politics. And as China’s growth 
slows, nationalism is a ready substitute for 
economic performance in maintaining public 
confidence in the CCP’s leadership. 
When it comes to stoking nationalist fervor, 
Deng was willing to use tanks to impose his 
vision for China’s future, most notoriously in the 
June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square massacre. Xi is 
equally concerned about keeping the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) under the control of the 
CCP, but these days the PLA is more likely to be 
engaged in the Himalayas or the South China 
Seathan in the streets of Beijing. For Xi, the PLA 
is more useful as a tool for fostering jingoistic 
populism than for direct political repression. 
So although Xi is careful to publicly insist on the 
primacy of political over military authority, that 
almost goes without saying in today’s China. The 
PLA no longer poses an immediate threat to the 
Chinese people; its new planes and aircraft 
carriers are much more of a menace to China’s 
neighbors than to its civilian population. And all 
the indications are that muscular militarism is 
just as popular in China as it is in the United 
States, if not more so. The first major element of 
Xi Jinping Thought is thus the transformation of 
the PLA from a reserve force for internal 
repression into a combat force capable of 
projecting Chinese power in the world. 
NATION, BELT, AND ROAD 
The second half of Xi Jinping Thought is 
community, both internal and external. The 
internal community is the community of the 
“Chinese nation,” which a relatively newconcept 
in Chinese politics. The old Republic of China, 
before the exile of its government on Taiwan, 
used to maintain a doctrine of the so-called five 
nations of China: Han (Chinese), Manchu, 
Mongols, Hui (or Muslims), and Tibetans. 
From its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic 
of China officially recognized a myriad 
of national minorities, originally echoing the 
official propaganda of the Soviet Union in 
constructing the country as a union of many 
nations. Xi Jinping Thought leaves all that 
behind. 
In Xi’s China, there is only one nation—the 
Chinese nation. Inevitably constructed around 
the majority Han identity, Chinese nationalism 
is consolidating (with strong official support) 
around a standardized Mandarin language and 
an anodyne, twenty first century version of 
Confucianism. Outside China, these two 
initiatives are combined in the 
controversial Confucius Institutes, the Chinese 
government-funded language and culture 
centers that are embedded in some 500 
universitiesworldwide. What Confucius 
Institutes attempt to accomplish abroad, state 
media and school curricula relentlessly promote 
at home: a vision of China as a unified nation-
state that not only commands the obedience but 
also merits the loyalty of its citizens. 
Whereas late imperial and even early republican 
China saw itself as a community of nations, 
modern-century China is returning to the more 
ancient idea of China as the central state of a 
wider Eurasian world, or tianxia. The very word 
for China in Chinese, Zhongguo, literally means 
Central State (or, more poetically, Middle 
Kingdom), and until the integration of China 
into a European-centered world-economy China 
was indeed the central state of its own, largely 
distinct world. Xi’s signature foreign policy 
initiative, the One Belt, One Road program of 
Eurasian infrastructure development, is 
explicitly designed to put China back at the 
economic and political center of the continent. 
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THE 2021 CENTENARY 
In 2021, China will celebrate the 100th 
anniversary of the CCP. This landmark 
centenary will presumably be celebrated in 
conjunction with the 20th National Congress, 
and Xi will set the agenda. No one knows 
whether and to what extent Xi will extend his 
rule beyond 2021, but it is almost certain that he 
will use the 2021 centenary of the CCP as an 
opportunity to imprint his understanding of 
China’s national identity in the hearts of his 
compatriots and the minds of the world. 
Xi Jinping Thought may seem at first glance a 
meaningless slogan, but on deeper inspection it 
reveals a unified program of, to use Xi’s words, 
“national rejuvenation.” Frenchmen might look 
to the French Revolution, Germans to the 1848 
Spring of Nations, Japanese to the Meiji 
Restoration, and Italians to the Risorgimento 
for a better understanding of Xi’s project. Xi 
Jinping Thought is nothing less than a program 
for the birth of a post-communist (although not 
post-party) Chinese nation-state. 
The full name for his agenda, “Xi Jinping 
Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era,” betrays the key 
point. Socialism with Chinese characteristics has 
been a mainstay of CCP propaganda since the 
Deng era. The new era, the Xi era, is still a work 
in progress. The dual transformations needed to 
usher it in—of the PLA and of the Chinese 
nation itself—are still underway. Look for the 
culmination of Xi’s political project, the birth of 
a new Chinese nation-state, at the CCP 
centenary in 2021. Until then, we can only guess 
at what the future will really look like. Perhaps 
Xi himself doesn’t even know, but he’ll be sure 
to have an answer ready in five years. 
CORRECTION APPENDED (November 16, 
2017) 
An earlier version of this article incorrectly 
stated that the centenary of the CCP will take 
place in 2022. It will take place in 2021. 
 
